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ABSTRACT
To identify the effect of social capital on financial development, we exploit the well-known
differences in social capital and trust  (Banfield (1958), Putnam (1993)) across different parts of
Italy, using microeconomic data on households and firms. In areas of the country with high levels
of social trust, households invest less in cash and more in stock, use more checks, have higher access
to institutional credit, and make less use of informal credit. In these areas, firms also have more
access to credit and are more likely to have multiple shareholders. The effect of trust is stronger
where legal enforcement is weaker and among less-educated people.  The behavior of movers is
mainly affected by the level of trust of the environment where they live, but a significant fraction of
the effect is also due to the level of trust  prevailing in the province where they grew up.  
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Paola-Sapienza@kellogg.nwu.eduIn 1958 when Baneld wrote \The Moral Basis of a Backward Society", few economists
noticed. His thesis that the underdevelopment of Southern Italy was due to the lack of
social trust outside the strict family circle (which he labeled \amoral familism") was hard
to reconcile with the economic models prevailing at that time. Forty years later, however,
developments in economic theory allow us to appreciate the intrinsic limitations agents face
in contracting and the potential role social capital can play in reducing the deadweight loss
generated by these limitations.
For this reason, the work of Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) has captured the
attention of several economists. La Porta et al. (1997a), for example, document a remarkable
correlation between the trust prevailing in a country and the presence of large organizations.
Similarly, Knack and Kneefer (1996) nd a correlation between a country's level of trust and
its rate of growth. Finally, Knack and Zak (1999) show that this correlation exists even after
controlling for quality of law enforcement.
The skeptics, however, could still object (e.g., Solow (1995)), since the theoretical link
between social capital and growth is very indirect. Even Putnam (1993) admits that the
mechanisms through which \the norms and network of the civic community contribute to
economic prosperity" should be investigated further.
In this paper we take Putnams suggestion seriously and investigate the link between the
level of social capital and one important factor underlying economic prosperity: nancial
development. Financing is nothing but an exchange of a sum of money today for a promise
to return more money in the future. Whether such an exchange will take place depends upon
not only the enforceability of contracts, but also the extent the nancier trusts the nancee.
In fact, nancial contracts are trust intensive contracts par excellence. Thus, if trust matters,
it should matter most for the development of nancial markets. Documenting this link can
not only shed some light on the mechanism through which social capital contributes to
economic prosperity, but also provide a new explanation for the widely dierent levels of
nancial development across countries.
Unfortunately, the use and availability of nancial contracts across countries is aected
by many other factors, dicult to control for in a regression (Mankiw (1995)). Thus, one
1would like to investigate the relation between social capital and nancial development within
an otherwise homogenous society. The problem with this approach is that, in general, the
level of social capital is a national characteristic.
A noticeable exception is Italy. In spite of having been a unied country for the last
140 years, with common legal, administrative, judiciary, regulatory, and tax systems, Italy
is characterized by wide dierences in the level of social capital between its Northern and
Southern regions. In fact, Italy is the country where sociologists rst turned to study the
eects of trust and social capital (Baneld (1958), Putnam (1993)).
In this paper we exploit this within-country variation to identify the eects of trust on
the use and availability of nancial contracts. We implement our test using data from two
dierent surveys on households and rms. The Survey on Households Income and Wealth
(SHIW) contains information on portfolio decisions, use of various nancial contracts, as well
as detailed geographical and individual characteristics for a sample of 32,700 households. The
Survey of Manufacturing Firms (SMF) contains information on access to credit and ownership
structure as well as rms' demographics for a representative sample of 4,400. As a proxy for
trust, we follow Putnam (1993) in using a measure of civic engagement. This is justied by
the close correlation between trust, social capital and measures of civicness (Putnam (1993),
Brehm and Rahn (1997), Knack and Keefer (1996)).
Using a variety of specications and samples, and controlling for various individual and
geographical characteristics, we study the eect of trust on households' portfolio allocation
and use of checks, availability of loans to households and rms, reliance on informal lending,
and ownership structure of rms.
Consistent with trust being important, we nd that in areas characterized by high levels
of trust, households invest a smaller proportion of their nancial wealth in cash and a bigger
proportion in stock. This result is true even after controlling for a large set of households'
characteristics and some other environmental variables, such as quality of legal enforcement
and per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In high trust areas, households are also more
likely to use personal checks, and to obtain credit when they demand it. We also nd similar
results for rms. In high trust areas rms are less likely to be turned down for credit and more
2likely to have multiple shareholders. These results are not driven by omitted environmental
variables, since we show that the behavior of movers is still aected by the level of trust of
their province of origin.
Consistent with Baneld's and Fukuyama's claim that low trust areas are often charac-
terized by more intense reliance on transactions within narrow subgroups, such as families
and friends, we nd that the likelihood of receiving a loan from a relative or a close friend
is decreasing in the level of trust prevailing in the area. We also document that trust is not
simply the equilibrium outcome of a society where legal enforcement leads people to maintain
their legal promises. In fact, we nd that trust matters, even after controlling for the quality
of the court system. Nevertheless, the eect of trust on the use and availability of nancial
contracts is stronger when legal enforcement is weaker, suggesting that trust matters more
where the legal system is less ecient. Similarly, the eect of trust is stronger among less-
educated people, who need to rely more on trust because of their limited understanding of
contracting mechanisms.
These results, if conrmed in other environments, have very strong implications for de-
veloping countries. In fact, trust or social capital seems to matter the most when education
levels are low and law enforcement is weak: this is precisely the status of many developing
countries.
We also try to shed some light on the origin of trust. If trust is an equilibrium outcome
of a society where non-legal mechanisms force people to behave cooperatively (e.g. Coleman
(1990) and Spagnolo (1999)), each individual should have a level of trust that depends on
the opportunity he has to retaliate. Since the opportunity to retaliate is driven by the level
of social interactions, an individual should re
ect the level of trust of the area in which he
lives, regardless of the one in which he was born. On the other hand, if trust is a moral
attitude imprinted with education (e.g. Baneld, 1958, and Fukuyama, 1995) an individual
should retain the level of trust typical of the place where he grew up, which we capture with
the province of birth. We try to distinguish between these two interpretations by focusing
on the households that moved. For those, it is possible to separately identify the eect of
the environment they grew up in and the environment where they live. In general, most of
3the eect is due to the level of trust prevailing in the area where they live. But a signicant
fraction (roughly a third) of the eect is due to the the level of trust prevailing in the area
where they were born.
Besides the above-mentioned literature on trust and social capital, our work is most
closely related to a growing number of studies of the eects of local interaction on criminal
behavior (Case and Katz (1991), Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996)) and on shirking
(Ichino and Maggi (1999)). Interestingly, the Italian regions where Ichino and Maggi (1999)
nd the highest level of shirking are those with the lowest levels of social capital. In this
context our study can be considered as an attempt to estimate the positive (rather than the
negative) spillover of social interaction and investigate how they depend on the institutional
characteristics (legal environment) and personal characteristics (education).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I discusses the notion of social capital
and its measures. Section II describes the data. Section III discusses the hypotheses we will
test. Section IV presents the results for the sample of households, while Section V the results
for the sample of rms. Section VI explores when trust is more important, while Section VII
tries to uncover the origin of trust by separating the eect of the trust of the province of
residence from the trust of the province of birth. Conclusions follow.
I The Concept of Social Capital
A What Is Social Capital?
There is a growing literature in sociology and political science on the concept of social capital
and its ubiquitous eects. Several important contributions (e.g.: Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama,
1995) have established that the extent people participate in social activities and trust each
other dier strikingly across regions/countries with important institutional and economic
consequences: better functioning institutions, bigger rms, higher economic growth.
Dierent authors disagree on the precise nature of social capital and its relation with
trust. Jacobs (1961) denes social capital as \neighborhood networks", while Putnam (1995)
as \feature of social life - networks, norms, and trust - that enable participants to act together
4more eectively to pursue shared objectives." Coleman (1990) sees trust as a product of social
capital, while Fukuyama (1995, 1997) equates trust with social capital. 1
What is the `right' denition does not matter much from an empirical point of view. All
of them are extremely highly correlated, both in principle and in practice. For example,
in his study of sub-national governments in Italy, Putnam (1993) showed that social trust
in Italian regions is closely correlated with several measures of civic engagement. Close
correlation between social trust and measures of civicness is documented not only across
time and across individuals, but also across countries. Knack and Keefer (1996) nd that
trust in people is correlated with civic norms. Using the General Social Survey data from
1972 to 1994, Brehm and Rahn (1997) also nd that civic engagement (as measured by
membership in civic and political organizations) and interpersonal trust are correlated.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to separate out the contribution of social capital
and trust to the development of nance, according to various denitions, the distinction that
we make in Section VII makes some progress in distinguishing the origin of social capital.
By looking at the behavior of movers we are able to separate the importance of legal rules,
non- legal enforcement mechanism, and moral attitudes on the degree in which people trust
each other.
B How Do We Measure Social Capital?
In his critique to Fukuyama Solow writes \if 'social capital' is to be more than a buzzword,
something more than mere relevance or even importance is required. Those cultural and social
formations should be closely analogous to a stock or inventory, capable of being characterized
as larger or smaller than another such stock. ... The stock of social capital should somehow
be measurable, even inexactly."
1Achieving a more precise distinction between trust and social capital requires narrowing down their
denition. Coleman (1990) denes social capital as the extent and completeness of horizontal relations within
a community and its role is to enhance the power and ecient allocation of social sanctions. Social capital is
thus identied with a society enforcement power. Trust can then be seen as the equilibrium expectations that
are sustained by the level of social capital available in a community in games that involve its members (see
also Spagnolo, 1999). In this context, while the two concepts are distinct, they are highly correlated: areas
with more social capital are areas where people have more trust.
5Measuring social capital is indeed a daunting task, substantially more complicated than
measuring physical or human capital (themselves not trivial tasks). Similar to human cap-
ital, social capital has several aspects and each measure is bound to capture only some.
Nevertheless, two approaches have prevailed in the literature.
First, a survey-based measure of how much people trust each other. The most famous
example is the World Values Survey, which interviewed samples of people of varying size
across 40 countries asking them \Generally speaking, would you say that most people can
be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?". While surveys speak
directly to one important dimension of social capital (i.e., trust), they face two problems.
First, as shown by Glaeser et al. (1999), responses tend to be more highly correlated with
the degree of trustworthiness of the respondent rather than with his level of trust. Second,
how can one trust the response to a survey of a person who is not trustworthy?
The second approach tries to measure other dimensions of social capital, like civic engage-
ments, relying on observable behavior. For example, in his study of sub-national governments
in Italy, Putnam (1993) measures social capital through several measures of civic engagement:
voter turnout at referenda, newspaper readership, membership in non-prot \horizontal" as-
sociations, and the diusion of preference vote in the political elections. The advantage of
this approach is that the measures themselves are much more reliable than subjective survey
responses. The disadvantage is that it is unclear whether this measure captures trust, sense
of duty, or instilled moral values. In our case this does not represent a serious shortcoming,
since we are only interested in establishing whether social capital is important and not which
aspects of social capital are more important.
We follow this second approach and construct two measures of social capital. First, we use
a measure of civic engagement at the provincial level borrowed from Putnam (1993): voter
turnout at the provincial level.2 Besides being readily available, this measure has several nice
features that make it very appealing for our study. First, unlike newspaper readership or
participation in organizations, voter turnout is unlikely to be driven by other local economic
2Italian territory is divided into 95 provinces, which by and large correspond to U.S. counties.
6factors (presence of local newspapers, subsidy to certain associations). In fact, voter turnout
is one of the phenomena economists are least able to explain on the basis of standard economic
models. Thus, it is a good candidate to capture non economic (social) characteristics, such
as trust in institutions, sense of duty, and civicness, all important components of social
capital. Second, electoral turnout is accurately measured at the provincial level. Data refer
to the whole population (not just a sample) and are essentially free of measurement errors.
Finally, this measure is highly correlated with all the other measures of social capital (Putnam
(1993)). Furthermore, it is correlated with social trust, as measured by the World Values
Survey, across the U.S. states (Putnam 1995).
Following Putnam (1993) we don't measure electoral turnout in general elections.3 In-
stead, we measure electoral turnout for all the European elections (1979, 1984, 1989, 1994
and 1999) and on six referenda (see appendix for details). As documented by Putnam, the
ranking across provinces in voter turnout is remarkably stable over time.
A second, rougher, measure of social capital we use is the part of the country where a
household or rm is located. Geographically, one can distinguish Italy in three areas: North
(north of the Appennine Mountains), Center (between the Appennine and Rome), and South
(south of Rome). In the work of Baneld (1958) and Putnam (1993), the South of Italy is
the prototypical area decient in social capital and trust, while the North is richer in both.
Ichino and Maggi (1999) support this view by showing that the degree of shirking of the
employees of the same bank is signicantly higher in the South even controlling for several
characteristics of the employees as well as those of the individual branches. Accordingly we
will use an indicator variable for the North as a proxy for high trust areas and an indicator
variable for the South as a proxy for low trust areas.
3Although electoral turnout is a standard measure of political participation, Putnam pointed out that
turnout at general elections in Italy may not be a good measure of civic engagement. First, electoral turnout
in general elections is likely to be aected by the existence of an Italian law that required all the citizens to
vote in general elections. Second, electoral turnout may be dierent in areas were the practice of political
patronage is more widespread or political parties are more organized.
7II The Data
We use data from two microeconomic surveys on households and rms that contain informa-
tion on various measures of the use and availability of nancial contracts. Thus, we start by
presenting the characteristics of these datasets. In the next section we will illustrate what
theory predicts regarding the possible eects of trust on these measures.
Information about households is drawn from the Survey of Households Income and Wealth
(SHIW). This survey, which is conducted by the Bank of Italy on a representative sample
of about 8,000 households, collects detailed information on Italian household income, con-
sumption, and wealth as well as their portfolio allocation across nancial instruments and
their access to formal and informal credit. For each household, the data also contain infor-
mation on characteristics of the households' head, such as education, age, place of birth, and
residence.
One of the unique features of this survey is its ability to distinguish between households
that did not want a loan from households that did not succeed in obtaining a loan because
they were either turned down or did not apply because expected to be turned down. The
survey also reveals the existence of informal credit (i.e., credit extended by friends and
family). A more detailed description of the dataset, with the actual questions asked to the
people interviewed, is contained in the Appendix.
This survey is conducted every two years. Since the last four (1989-1995) have maintained
the same structure, we pool them together, obtaining a sample of 32,686 observations. The
survey has a rotating panel component, thus 9,287 of these observations come from the same
household re-interviewed in a dierent year. In the analysis we will check the robustness of
our results to eliminating these repeated observations. Excluding a few households reporting
negative consumption and/or income (17 observations), 4 observations with all missing values
and 48 observations reporting age above 90 or other inconsistent data, the sample contains
32,617 households if repeated observations are included, or 23,330 households if repeated
observations are excluded.
As for rms, we use the 1994 Survey of Manufacturing Firms (SMF) conducted by Medio-
8credito Centrale (an investment bank) on a random sample of over 4,400 small and medium-
sized (mostly privately held) manufacturing rms with at least 10 employees. The SMF -
whose main purpose is to gather information on rms' innovation activities and internation-
alization - collects a variety of data including employment, access to credit, and ownership
structure. It also contains a detailed description of the rms' demographics (geographical
location, year of foundation, sector, form of incorporation, whether it belongs to a group
etc.).
For a subset of rms in the SMF, balance sheets and income statements are also available
{ allowing us to construct measures of protability and indebtedness which we use as controls
in our regressions. Excluding rms for which balance sheet data is not available results in
a reference sample of 3,539 rms whose characteristics, in terms of the distribution of rms
by size, location, and sector are very similar to those of the whole sample. The Appendix
reports a description of the content and sampling properties of the SMF together with a
description of the variables used in the estimates.
We further augment our household-level and rm-level data with two other variables. The
rst is a measure of economic development, measured by GDP per capita in the province.
This measure is released by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). The second is a
novel measure of the eciency of law enforcement: the average number of years it takes to
complete a rst-degree trial in the courts located in the province. This measure is computed
using data on the length of trials released by the Ministry of Justice.
Finally, for both households and rms we know the province where the household cur-
rently resides or the rm is located. Accordingly, we merge the households and the rms
datasets with our measure of social capital and attach to each household (rm) the measure
of social capital in the province where it is located. In addition, we also know the province
where the household head was born. We use this as a proxy for the area in which an indi-
vidual was raised, and for the level of social capital prevailing there (which we label trust of
origin).
9A Measures of Use and Availability of Financial Instruments
Table 1 reports summary statistics of all the variables used in our regressions. It is important
to review the measures of use and availability of nancial instruments that will appear as
dependent variables in our regressions. The rst one is the proportion of nancial wealth a
household retains in cash. All the observations are equally weighted, thus the mean (24%)
is distorted by the fact that poorer people detain 100% of their nancial wealth in cash. A
value weighted average gives a more reasonable 2.4%. This feature highlights the importance
of controlling for the level of wealth (and its square to capture possible nonlinearities) in any
regression.
The second measure is the proportion of nancial wealth a household detains in deposits,
both bank and postal (which in Italy are very important). Deposits represent the main
savings instrument for the households in the sample.
The third measure is the fraction of nancial wealth detained in stock. The low mean (3%)
is consistent with the limited role played by the stock market in Italy (e.g., Pagano, Panetta,
and Zingales (1998)). The fourth measure is an indicator variable of whether a household
uses checks. Interestingly, half of the households interviewed do not use any check.
The next two variables pertain to a household ability to access the credit market. \Dis-
couraged or turned down" is an indicator variable equal to one if a household responds
positively to at least one of the following questions: \During the year did you or a member
of the household think of applying for a loan or a mortgage to a bank or other nancial in-
termediary, but then changed your mind on the expectation that the application would have
been turned down?", \During the year did you or a member of the household apply for a loan
or a mortgage from a bank or other nancial intermediary and your application was turned
down?". 2% of the sample households were discouraged from borrowing (i.e. answered yes
to the rst question), while 1% of the sample households were turned down (i.e. answered
yes to the second question). Finally, \family loan" is an indicator variable equal to one if a
household responds positively to the question: \As of the end of the year did you have debts
outstanding towards friends or relatives not living with you?". 3% the sample households
10received such loans.
On the rms' side, we focus on two measures. One, \turned down", is analogous to the
household variable. It is an indicator variable taking value one if a rm answers positively
to the question: \In 1994 did you apply to a bank or a nancial intermediary to have your
loans increased and were turned down by all of those to whom you applied?". 5% of the
sample rms were turned down. Finally, as a measure of a rm's ability to raise equity capital
externally, we use an indicator variable taking a value of one if a rm's largest shareholder
holds 100 percent of the rm's shares and zero otherwise. 16% of the sample rms have only
one shareholder.
In all the regressions, we control for the eciency of law enforcement (linear and squared)
as measured by the number of years it takes to complete a rst-degree trial in the courts
located in the province. As Table 1 indicates, there is wide variation in this measure, ranging
from 1.5 to 8.3 years, with a mean of 3.6 and a standard deviation of 1.25.
Finally, to ensure that the level of trust is not simply a proxy for economic development,
we control for the latter by using the GDP per capita in the province. In this case too, there
are wide variations, with values ranging from 10 million liras to 70 million liras (between
$6,000 and $39,000 per capita.4 Note that inserting this control will underestimate the
eect of trust. In fact, as Putnam shows, trust, far from being a consequence of economic
modernization, is a precondition of it. Thus, some of the eect of trust will be re
ected in
the level of income per capita.5
III Theoretical Predictions
In order to identify the theoretical link between social capital and nancial development we
focus on one aspect of social capital: trust. Similar predictions can be derived if we interpret
social capital as set of moral or civic norms.
Financial contracts are an exchange of a sum of money today for a promise to return
4We use an exchange rate of $ 1 = Lit 1,800.
5Consistent with this interpretation, the impact of trust becomes larger and more statistically signicant
when we omit GDP per capita from the regressions.
11more money in the future. For this exchange to take place the nancier must believe that
the promise is suciently credible. The major factor supporting this credibility is clearly
the possibility of enforcing the letter of the contract in a court of law. But this is not the
only source of credibility. Enforcement is expensive and sometimes ineective. If a nancier
fears that the nancee might disappear with the money, the protection provided by the
contract is very limited. Similarly, restrictions on the possibility to in
ict punishment reduce
the eectiveness of contracts in preventing inecient moral hazard. Finally, contracts are
intrinsically incomplete, making it impossible to provide a bullet proof guarantee to the
nancier.
Thus, even in countries (or areas) where contracts are promptly and justly enforced, the
degree of trust a nancier has in the nancee plays a crucial role in fostering transactions:
the rst order implication is that trust fosters nancial transactions, even after controlling
for the quality of law enforcement.
A Trust and Portfolio Allocation
In allocating their nancial wealth all the households face the same variety of nancial
instruments. Each of these instruments, however, requires a dierent degree of trust by
the investor.
At one extreme of the distribution of nancial instruments, is cash. By retaining its
savings in cash, a household avoids the need to trust others. Cash, then, is the ultimate
refuge for an investor who does not trust anybody. Not surprisingly, the traditional way of
storing savings was cash under the mattress. Thus, we should expect that households living
in low-trust areas retain more of their wealth in cash.
At the other extreme of the distribution, is stock. An equity investor receives very few
contractual protections (especially in Italy, see Zingales (1994)). Thus, he is willing to invest
in stock only if he trusts the company he is investing in. We should expect, then, that
households living in low-trust areas invest less of their wealth in stock.
In the middle of the distribution, are bank deposits. Since depositors lose control of their
money, deposits require more trust than cash. On the other hand, there are several reasons
12why they require less trust than stock. First, bank deposits are callable on demand, giving
a huge power to the investor, which helps reduce his fear of being expropriated. Second,
deposits are insured, which protects deposits from bank insolvency (though not from fraud).
Finally, the banking sector is heavily regulated and closely supervised by the Bank of Italy.
While the objective of both the regulation and the supervision is dierent, it does provide a lot
of monitoring to reassure fearful investors. Thus, here we do not have a clear-cut prediction.
Nevertheless, it is still interesting to perform such a test, to verify to what extent trust is
important. If trust also positively aects the percentage of wealth invested in deposits, then
it implies that the importance of trust is very pervasive.
Of course, all these implications are ceteris paribus. Thus, in the empirical specications
we have to control for several household characteristics (such as wealth, education, age, etc.).
Fortunately, the dataset is suciently rich to allow us to do so.
B Trust and the Use of Checks
The use of personal checks is clearly an activity that requires a lot of trust. In fact, trust
is needed from both sides. The person receiving the check has to trust that the issuer has
enough funds in the bank to honor the payment. On the other hand, the person issuing the
check has to trust the receiver not to falsify the amount written on the check. Furthermore,
if the check is mailed, the issuer has to trust that the check will not be stolen in the mail and
cashed by a dierent person. This is not an unusual event in Italy, so much that it in
uences
people willingness to use checks. For example, one of the authors was very hesitant to
purchase mutual funds via a check in the United States, for fear the check might be stolen.
Thus, we should expect that households living in low-trust areas are less likely to use
checks. At the same time, we expect that the probability of using checks is aected not only
by the trust of the place of residence, but also by the trust of its place of origin. Mistrust
in others might be retained, even after moving to a dierent environment, as our personal
experience suggests.
13C Trust and Lending
Lending is also a trust intensive activity. Thus, we expect that the supply of loans to
households and to rms is positively aected by the average level of trust in the province.
Fortunately, the data allow us to separate demand and supply. For both households and
rms we have the information on whether the respondent requested a loan and was turned
down or was discouraged from applying. Thus, a higher level of trust should decrease the
the probability a household (a rm) is denied credit or is discouraged from applying.
D Trust and Family Lending
One interesting feature of our dataset is that it contains also information on informal lending:
loans by relatives and friends. How do we expect them to vary with the degree of trust?
As for any type of lending, a higher level of trust should lead to more lending. In this case,
however, there are three forces pushing in the opposite direction. First, informal lending is
a substitute for formal lending, when the latter is either unavailable or too expensive. As we
argued above, the access to formal lending is jeopardized by lack of trust. Thus, the demand
for loans from friends and family increases in areas with low trust. Since for these informal
loans we do not separately observe the demand and supply, but simply their existence, it is
well possible that the demand eect dominates and that the likelihood of loans by friends
and family is higher in areas with low trust.
Second, there might be a substitution eect on the supply of loans. In low trust areas,
the group with the highest comparative advantage in undertaking trust intensive activities
(such as lending) is a group with a comparatively high level of trust (such as friends and
family).
Finally, many authors (Baneld (1958), Fukuyama (1995)) have emphasized that low lev-
els of trust toward others are generally associated with high levels of trust within subgroups,
such as the family. The term \amoral familism" coined by Baneld signies the existence
of very high levels of trust within the family, and very low levels outside of it. This leads
naturally to move transactions from the market to the restricted family circle.
14Given the importance of these three factors, we should expect a higher incidence of loans
by friends and family in low-trust areas (thus a negative correlation between the likelihood
of informal loans and the level of trust).
E Trust and Ownership Structure
The rm dataset also contains information about ownership structure. In particular, we are
able to determine whether the rm has a single shareholder or multiple ones.
Since the rms in our sample are mostly privately held, increasing the number of share-
holders often implies sharing control in some form or another. Thus, a single owner is less
willing to expand the shareholders base if he does not trust the new potential participants.
On the other hand, potential investors are less willing to invest in the rm, if they do not
trust the person running it.
Thus, in this case both demand and supply considerations lead to predict a lower incidence
of a single shareholder in high-trust areas.
F When Does Trust Matter More?
Thus, far we have implicitly assumed that the degree of trust required is a characteristic of
a nancial instrument. However, the importance of trust in fostering nancial transactions
is likely to be aected by other environmental and individual characteristics.
The importance of trust is larger in areas where law enforcement is not prompt. If it
takes more than three years to enforce a contract (as is the case in Italy), the willingness to
nance a person or enterprise will depend even more crucially on the degree to which this
person or rm is trusted by the nancier. This suggests that on average we should expect
a bigger eect of trust on nancial development in Italy than in countries like Sweden or
the United States where law enforcement is more ecient. More importantly, the above
reasoning suggests that cross-sectionally we should expect a higher marginal eect of trust
in parts of Italy where law enforcement is comparatively worse.
The degree of trust required for a nancial transaction should also depend on the level of
education of the individuals involved in the transaction. Compare two investors considering
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nancial prospectus, and an unsophisticated one, who cannot understand most of the terms.
The latter clearly needs a much higher dose of trust to buy the same stock. The inability to
fully grasp all the details of the contract involved make it impossible for the unsophisticated
investor to discriminate between legitimate investments and frauds. At the same time, lacking
the understanding of the legal protections oered, the unsophisticated investor would be
more suspicious in general. Finally, if an investor is not endowed with the necessary ability
or information to make sophisticated nancial decisions (e.g. managing his portfolio) he can
delegate this function to somebody else. But delegation requires trusting other people. For
these reasons, the unsophisticated investor will require more trust to enter into a nancial
contract. The prediction, then, is that the marginal impact of trust on the use of nancial
contracts is higher among uneducated people than among educated people.
G Origin of Trust
The term trust is used to explain very dierent phenomena. Trust can simply be the equilib-
rium outcome of a society where legal enforcement leads people to maintain their promises.
Dened in this way, the concept of trust is rather uninteresting, since the benets of law
enforcement have long been recognized. To ensure that this is not what we are capturing, in
all our regressions we control for the quality of legal enforcement.
Alternatively, trust could be the equilibrium outcome of a society where non-legal mech-
anisms force people to behave cooperatively. For example, in small communities, with multi-
dimensional interactions, people may rely more on others keeping their promises, for fear of
being ostracized by the community (Spagnolo (1999)). Finally, trust may re
ect the expec-
tation that people will behave cooperatively as a result of a moral attitude imprinted with
education (Baneld, 1958). According to these two latter non mutually exclusive denitions,
trust is something above and beyond the eect of legal enforcement: an element that fosters
cooperation and economic development. It is the social capital Fukuyama (1995) talks about.
If trust is the expectation of non-legal enforcement, each individual should have a level of
trust that depends on the opportunity he has to retaliate. Since the opportunity to retaliate
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ect the level of trust of
the area in which he lives, regardless of the one in which he was born. On the other hand,
if trust is a moral attitude imprinted with education, an individual should retain the level of
trust typical of the place where he grew up.
Of course, these eects cannot be separated for people who were born and live in the same
place. But the existence of several movers in our sample provides us with the opportunity
to try and distinguish between these two possible sources of trust.
Interestingly, the relative importance of the trust of origin and the trust of residence
should not necessarily be the same for all the nancial contracts we study. Some (like access
to loans) depend on how much the respondent is trusted by other people living in the province,
while others (like the investment in stock) depends on the trust the respondent has in others.
This distinction, however, is possibly confused by discrimination: it may be the case that
the trust of origin captures the attitude of indigenous toward "foreign born". Thus, it is
highly possible that a northern banker will ceteris paribus more likely turn down the loan
application of a southern applicant than the one of a northern applicant.
IV Empirical Results in the Household Sample
A Investment in Cash
Tables 2A and B report the results of the eect of trust on the amount of cash held by
a household. The proportion of nancial wealth detained in cash is regressed on the level
of trust, the level of judicial eciency (linear and squared), the GDP per capita, several
household characteristics, and three calendar year dummies.
All three variables of interest are measured at the province level. As this might just re
ect
correlation in the residuals, we correct the standard errors for clustering at the provincial
level.
The household's specic variables (coecient not reported) are household income (linear
and squared), household wealth (linear and squared), the number of people belonging to the
household, the number of kids in the household, households head age (linear and squared),
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is married, is a male, for the sector in which he/she works, and for the level of job he/she
has.
Column I reports the tobit estimates of the basic specication. As expected, the level
of trust has a negative and highly statistically signicant coecient on the proportion of
wealth a household invests in cash. A one standard deviation increase in local trust reduces
the amount of cash by 7 percentage points: a reduction of almost a third in the amount of
cash held.
The degree of judicial ineciency has a non linear eect on the amount retained in cash.
This nonlinearity, which is present in most specications, is consistent with the role played
by courts. At low levels of ineciency, small variations can have a large impact on portfolio
choices. But beyond a certain point, legal enforcement becomes inframarginal and a further
increase in the degree of judicial ineciency has very little impact.
The level of per capita GDP has a negative and statistically signicant eect on the
amount retained in cash. Since other studies (Knack and Kneefer (1996), Zak and Knack
(1999)) have shown that the level of trust is positively correlated with economic development,
the per capita GDP might absorb some of the eect of trust. Nevertheless, we think it is
necessary to insert it into the regression to control for factors that are associated with nancial
development, but have nothing to do with trust. Consistent with our prior, excluding per
capita GDP from the regression (not reported) increases both the size of the coecient of
trust and its statistical signicance.
Column II reports the estimates obtained from a similar specication, where, as a proxy
for trust, we use instead two indicator variables, for the Northern and the Southern regions.
As expected, households in the North (where trust is higher) retain 5% less cash than house-
holds in the Center (the omitted dummy), while households in the South (where trust is
lower) retain 15% more cash, even after controlling for dierences in wealth, income, etc.
Thus, Northern households hold 20% less cash than Southern households.
One might object that this result may be due to the higher presence of organized crime
in the South, who prefer to retain wealth in cash to be less visible. This objection, however,
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Thus, it is highly unlikely that an organized crime participant would agree to answer these
questions. Another possibility is that households retain their nancial wealth in cash to hide
it from tax investigations. Even in this case it would be surprising that the same people
would be willing to reveal this information to the Bank of Italy, which is a Government
institution. Most likely they would refuse to participate in the survey or, if they participate,
to under-report the amount of cash holdings.6
Consistent with our using them as a proxy for trust, the North-South indicator variables
turn out to be highly correlated with the Putnam measure of trust. The correlation between
the North indicator and our measure of trust is 58%, while there is a negative correlation
of 85% between the South indicator and trust. This might generate the suspicion that the
eect we are capturing is due to some other dierences between the North and the South of
Italy, which happen to be correlated with our measure of trust. Column III of Table 2 shows
that this is not the case. After controlling for the North and South indicator variables, trust
still has a negative and statistically signicant eect on the proportion of wealth retained in
cash.
This last specication, however, does not completely eliminate the suspicion that some
environmental variable other than trust might be driving the results. For example, trust may
be capturing background risk (Kimball (1993)). The only way to rule this out would be to
estimate a model with xed provincial eects, which absorb all the factors that vary only at
provincial level.7 Unfortunately, these xed eects would also absorb our measure of trust.
Therefore, in order to identify the eect of trust, we resort to the trust of origin, i.e.,
the level of trust prevailing in the province where an individual was born. If trust is \the
product of preexisting communities of shared moral codes or values" (Fukuyama, 1995), it
might be assimilated with education in the early years of one's life. In such a case the level
of trust an individual has vis- a-vis the rest of the world might be accurately re
ected by the
6However, to rule out the possibility that tax evasion is driving our results we run the same regressions ex-
cluding self-employed workers (income underreporting is easier and thus more widespread among self employed
workers). The results (not reported) are unchanged.
7We will deal with background risk more specically in the next paragraph.
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in the province of birth, this measure of trust is not collinear with the province xed eect.
Thus, we estimate a linear probability model with province xed eects and the trust of
origin (plus the usual control variables). The trust of origin has a negative and statistically
signicant eect on the level of wealth invested in cash and this eect cannot be attributed
to omitted variables at the local level.
One possible critique to our xed eect estimates is that the results may be driven entirely
by movers born in areas with very low levels of trust. To make sure that the eect of trust
is not driven by a few individuals, we re-estimate the xed eect model considering only
movers moving from areas with low trust to areas with high trust. All results (not reported)
remain the same.
A nal concern is that the sample we use contains some repeated observations. While the
level of wealth invested in cash changes over time, the residuals might be correlated across
observations of the same individual. Since the cross-sectional correlation in the residuals is
conned to only a subset of the observations, and among these, to pairs of observations, this
is unlikely to be a problem. But rather than speculate, in Table 2B we re-estimate all the
regressions restricting the sample to the rst observation of every household. As expected,
the standard errors are slightly bigger. But all the results remain the same.
B Investment in Deposits
Table 3 repeats the same regressions of Table 2 with the proportion of nancial wealth
invested in deposits as a dependent variable. Interestingly, when we use the Putnam measure
of trust the proportion of nancial wealth held in deposits increases in trust and this eect
is statistically signicant.
When we use the geographical indicator, however, we nd that deposits are lower in the
South (where trust is very low), but also lower in the North (where trust is high), albeit this
latter eect is not statistically signicant. This suggests that the proportion of deposits is
particularly high in the central region of Italy. This is not very surprising. As we discuss in
Section III, the predicted eect of trust on deposits is ambiguous, depending on whether the
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In the South, it is probably the former, in the North the latter. This will nd conrmation
when we look at the proportion of wealth invested in stock.
As Column III shows, trust still has a positive and statistically signicant eect on the
proportion of wealth held in deposits, even after controlling for North and South. By contrast
the impact of trust of origin on deposits is negative, albeit not statistically signicant.
C Investment in Stock
Table 4 estimates the eect of trust on the proportion of nancial wealth invested in stock.
As predicted, the eect is positive and statistically signicant. This is true regardless of
the measure of trust used. In particular, the trust of origin has a strong positive eect on
the proportion of nancial wealth invested in stock, even after controlling for xed province
eects. The impact is also economically meaningful. A one-standard deviation increase in
trust leads to an increase of 13 percentage points in the proportion of wealth invested in
stock { 4.4 times the mean.
There are two concerns with our specication. The rst is that portfolio allocations are
aected by the individual level of risk aversion and it may be possible that our trust measure
is in fact capturing it. Fortunately, the 1995 survey makes an attempt to elicit attitudes
towards risk: each survey participant is oered a hypothetical lottery and is asked to report
the maximum price that he would be willing to pay in order to participate. By using the
responses to the question we are able to construct an Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk
aversion for 4,301 households. We thus re-estimated our basic regressions for cash, deposits
and stocks on this sub sample including among the regressors the inverse of a measure of
relative risk aversion, as implied by the solution of a standard portfolio problem a la Merton
(Merton 1971). We compute the relative risk aversion by multiplying the absolute risk
aversion and the level of household's consumption. In all three specications, the coecients
of trust preserve the same signs and are still statistically signicant, in spite of the smaller
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The second concern is that trust, as mentioned earlier, may be capturing dierences in
consumers exposure to uninsurable sources of uncertainty (background risk) which make
them less willing to buy risky assets. To address this potential problem we use a section of
the survey that collects data on the subjective probability distribution of future earnings: in
the 1995 surveyfor half of the sampled households each household member in working age
is asked to report his subjective assessment of the probability that he/she will loose his/her
job (if employed) or nd one (if unemployed) in the following twelve months. Conditional
on being employed he/she is then asked to report the minimum and maximum earnings and
the probability that earnings will fall below the mid-point of this range. Following Guiso,
Jappelli and Pistaferri (1998) we have used this information, referred to the household head
and available for 1916 households, to compute a measure of expected earnings and their
variance. We then re-estimated our regressions for cash, deposits and stocks adding these
variables scaled by total nancial assets. In all cases the sign and signicance of the coecient
of our measure of trust was unaected, indicating that it is not re
ecting omitted measures
of background risk; the latter instead has a negative eect on the demand for stock and a
positive one on that for deposits as suggested by theory.
In sum, the data conrm our predictions of the relation between trust and portfolio
allocation in cash and stocks. These results cannot be attributed to some omitted variables
at the local level and do not seem attributable to a spurious correlation of trust with risk
aversion, or background risk.
D Use of Checks
Another useful indicator of the use of nancial instruments is the reliance on checks to clear
transactions. Table 5 reports the probit estimates of the eect of trust on the probability a
household uses checks (recall that almost half of the sample does not).
8As further evidence that the coecient of trust is not capturing risk aversion, we found that the correlation
of trust and our measure of absolute risk aversion is negative, as one would expect, but extremely low (-.03).
Also, in a regression of the logarithm of absolute risk aversion on the logarithm of consumption and trust,
the latter carries a small negative coecient but is statistically insignicant.
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statistically signicant at the 1% level. The reported coecients are the eect of a marginal
change in the corresponding regressor on the probability of writing checks. Thus, we can
easily compute the impact of a one standard deviation increase in trust: it leads to a 10%
increase in the probability of using a check. Per capita GDP also has a positive impact on
the probability of using checks. This eect, which is highly signicant, also captures some of
the relation between trust and use of checks. Finally, as to be expected, in areas where courts
are more inecient households use less checks, but this eect is not statistically signicant.
It is well possible that the cost of a legal procedure (relatively to the size of the check) to
recover the money from a bad check is so large everywhere that dierences in the level of
legal enforcement become unimportant. If this interpretation is true, the role of trust is even
more important in this market.
A household can write a check only if it owns a checking account. On the other hand,
the reluctance in using checks and the lack of acceptance of personal checks undermine the
main reason to hold a checking account, i.e., being able to write checks. Thus, we think it is
correct not to restrict the sample to households that hold a checking account. At the same
time, we saw in Table 3 that the decision to hold an account in general is in
uenced by trust,
thus we want to be able to distinguish the eect of trust on check writing from the eect of
trust on deposits.
For this reason, in column II the sample is restricted to households that own a checking
account. The size of the coecient of trust is halved, but it is still positive and statistically
signicant (at the 10% level). Thus, there is an independent eect of trust on check writing.
We nd similar results when we use the geographical indicators of trust (column III).
Checks are used less in the South (where trust is very low), and more in the North (where
trust is high). Controlling for these geographical indicators, Putnam measure of trust still
has a positive eect on the probability of writing a check (column IV), but this eect is not
statistically signicant.
In the linear probability model, however, the trust of origin is positive and highly sta-
tistically signicant. This is interesting not only because it reassures us of the non spurious
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trust can work. In fact, the trust of origin re
ects the level of trust of the household writing
the check, but most likely not the level of trust of the people accepting checks. Thus, the
results in column V suggest that the lack of trust in others not forging or stealing a check
plays an important role. Alternatively, one can interpret this result as saying that indigenous
populations do not accept checks from people coming from areas with low trust. This is a
rational response if our measure of trust is also a proxy for trustworthiness, as found by
Glaeser et al. (1999). Finally, we cannot rule out pure discrimination. Since most movers
are southern, it may be the case that they tend to use less checks, not (only) because their
level of trust in others is low, but also because other people in their province of residence are
not willing to accept their checks.
E Availability of Credit to Consumers
Tables 6 reports the results regarding the eect of trust on the availability of loans to house-
holds. We estimate a probit model of the eect of trust on the probability of being a
discouraged or turned-down borrower, conditional on applying for a loan.9
As the table shows, trust has a negative eect on the probability of not having access
to credit. This eect is statistically signicant at the 1% level. The reported coecients in
Table 6 show that a one standard deviation increase in trust leads to a 0.48% decrease in the
probability of being discouraged or turned down. This corresponds to a 16% decrease in the
sample average probability of being a discouraged or turned down borrower.
We nd much weaker coecients when we use the geographical indicators of trust (column
II). As expected, households in the North (where trust is higher) are less likely to be credit
rationed than households in the South (where trust is lower), but the coecients are much
lower than those for the Putnam measure of trust. This suggests that the indicator variables
capture some other eects that may be going in the opposite direction. For example, it is
possible that in the South the larger presence of state-owned banks and the existence of
9We also estimated two separate probit models on the probability of being a discouraged borrower and on
the probability of being turned down. The results (not reported) conrm those showed in Tables 6.
24subsidized loan programs, controlling for other characteristics, increases the availability of
loans to households. To isolate the impact of trust from other dierences between North
and South we estimate the eect of the Putnam measure of trust, controlling for the North
and South indicators (column III). In both regressions the coecient of trust is even larger
than the one obtained in column I, suggesting that the geographical indicators of trust do
not capture anything beyond Putnam measure of trust.
Column IV of Table 6 shows that in the linear probability model the trust of origin
coecient is negative and highly statistically signicant.
F Informal Credit Market
Thus far, our analysis was restricted to institutional forms of investment and credit. Our
dataset, however, provides us with information on the presence of informal loans, i.e., loans
extended by friends or family members not living in the same household. As discussed
in Section III, we expect that informal credit might partially substitute for formal credit
wherever the latter is unavailable. Table 7 tests this prediction.
We estimate a probit model of the likelihood a household has a loan outstanding with
friends or relatives on our measures of trust and the usual control variables (income, wealth,
their squares, demographic characteristics, etc.). As expected, informal credit by friends
or relatives is more widespread in low trust areas. This eect is statistically signicant and
economically non-negligible. A one standard deviation decrease in trust boosts the likelihood
of an informal loan by almost 1% { a 24% increase in the sample average.
When we use the geographical indicators of trust (column II) the results are mixed.
Contrary to what theory would predict, households living in the North (where trust is higher)
are not less likely to receive loans from relatives and friends. By contrast, such probability
is 1.3% higher for households living in the South (where trust is lower). Once we control for
North and South, the eect of the Putnam measure of trust is virtually unchanged and still
highly signicant (column III).
These results are fully supported by the linear probability model that controls for province
xed eects (column IV). Households that come from low trust areas are more likely to receive
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(1995) claims that low trust societies rely more heavily on naturally high-trust relationships
like friends and family. It is also consistent with individuals absorbing these attitudes in the
early years of their lives.
V Empirical Results in the Firm Sample
Thus far, we have shown that trust aects the portfolio allocations of households, their use of
nancial instruments, and their access to formal and informal credit. An obvious question is
whether these results would extend to more complex organizations like rms. Firms operate
constantly on the market and, as such, may develop a reputation or may create alternative
mechanisms to alleviate the negative eects of the lack of trust.
For this reason, we now move to analyze the impact of trust on rms' nancing ability.
We focus on two dimensions. First, we look at the probability that a rm's demand for credit
is turned down, as done in Table 6.B for households. Second, we look at the availability of
equity nance by studying the ownership structure of these rms. Since most of the rms
in our sample are privately held, a good indicator of access to outside equity nance is the
presence of other shareholders besides the controlling one.
A Availability of Credit to Firms
Table 8 reports the results regarding the eect of trust on the availability of loans to rms.
We estimate a probit model of the eect of trust on the probability of a rm being turned
down, conditional on applying for a loan. Besides controlling for GDP per capita and judicial
eciency in the province, as done in the households estimates, all regressions include a set of
rm-level variables (a dummy equal to 1 for rms with below median employees, dummies for
whether the rm belongs to a business group, is incorporated or has its major competitors in
the same region; rm age, the three-year growth rate in sales, return on assets and a measure
of leverage) which are meant to proxy for a rm's riskiness and protability.
As the table shows, trust decreases the probability of being turned down and this eect
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standard deviation increase in trust leads to a 2% decrease in the probability of being turned
down, corresponding to a 36% decrease in the sample average probability of being turned
down.10
As with households, we nd a weaker eect when we use geographical indicators of trust
(column II). As expected, rms located in the North (where trust is higher) are less likely to
be credit rationed than rms located in the South (where trust is lower), but both coecients
are not statistically signicant.
When we control for North and South (column III), the eect of Putnam measure of trust
is still positive and borderline statistically signicant.
B Ownership Structure
In Section C we showed that households are less likely to invest in equity in low trust areas.
The counterpart of this eect should be that in these areas rms are less likely to have
multiple shareholders. We test this hypothesis in Table 9. We estimate a probit model of
the eect of trust on the probability of a rm having a single shareholder.
Firms located in high trust areas are more likely to have multiple shareholders and this
eect is statistically signicant at the 1% level. A one standard deviation increase in trust
leads to a 3% increase in the probability of having a single shareholder, corresponding to an
17% increase in the sample average probability.
We nd a weaker eect when we use geographical indicators of trust (column II). As
expected, rms located in the North (where trust is higher) are less likely to have a single
shareholder, while rms located in the South (where trust is lower) are more likely, but none
of the two coecients is statistically signicant.
When we control for North and South (column III), the eect of Putnam measure of trust
is still positive and statistically signicant.
10Some of the coecients that are estimated but not reported are interesting on their own. The probability
of being turned down is lower for larger rms and rms belonging to a group; it is increasing in leverage and
decreasing in age, protability and sales growth.
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Results so far have shown a remarkable and pervasive correlation between the degree of trust
of an area and the use and availability of nancial contracts. To gain more condence on
the causal nature of this correlation, we want to explore whether the magnitude of this eect
varies according to the theoretical predictions outlined in Section III. Therefore, we will
analyze how the impact of trust varies according to the quality of legal enforcement and the
level of education of the investors.
A Trust and Legal Enforcement
If trust is important when contracts are incomplete, it should be particularly relevant when
law enforcement is weak. Thus, we expect a higher marginal eect of trust in parts of Italy
where law enforcement is comparatively worse.
In Table 10 we re-estimate our basic specications, splitting the sample between provinces
with relatively ecient judicial system (judicial ineciency below the median of 3.7 years)
and provinces with relatively inecient judicial system (judicial ineciency above the me-
dian).
Table 10.A reports the tobit estimates of the eect of trust on the fraction of nancial
wealth invested in cash, deposits, and stocks. In all cases the impact of trust is larger (in
absolute terms) in areas with more inecient courts. The eect of trust on the fraction of
wealth invested in stock is three times as large in areas with weak law enforcement and this
dierence is statistically signicant at the 1% level. Also, in the case of wealth invested in
cash, the impact of trust is lower (only two-thirds) where the courts work better, albeit the
dierence is not statistically signicant. Only in the case of deposits are the two coecients
very similar. As discussed in Section III, the demand of deposits requires less trust because
they can be called on demand and because the supervision of the Bank of Italy reassures
investors. Both of these protections do not rely on the eciency of the court system. Thus,
it is not very surprising that the eect of trust does not vary according to the quality of law
enforcement.
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rst two columns of Table 10.B present the probit estimates of the likelihood of using
checks split according to the quality of legal enforcement in the area. The eect of trust is
three times as large as areas with weak legal enforcement. The dierence is statistically
signicant at the 1% level. In areas with better legal enforcement, trust does not have a
statistically signicant impact on the probability of using checks.
A similar picture emerges if we look at the eect of trust on access to credit. In areas with
weak law enforcement, the eect of trust has the expected sign and is statistically signicant
both for the probability of being discouraged from borrowing and for the probability of
being turned down after applying for a loan. By contrast, the eect is not signicant (and
quantitatively very small) in areas with better law enforcement.
Consistently, the eect of trust on informal credit is not statistically signicant in areas
with better law enforcement, while it is three times as big and statistically signicant in areas
with weak legal enforcement.
Similarly, the eect of trust on rms applying for a loan is not signicant (both economi-
cally and statistically) in areas with a better court system, while it is three times as big and
statistically signicant in areas with weak legal enforcement (Table 10.C).
The only exception to this pattern emerges in the last two columns of Table 10.C, where
the eect of trust on the likelihood of having a single shareholder is larger in areas with a
better court system, albeit the dierence is not statistically signicant.
Overall, the results seem to conform very well to the prediction that trust matters more
where legal enforcement is weak. This result raises the possibility that countries lacking
social capital can compensate for it with better legal enforcement. In practice, however,
countries decient in social capital also have weak legal enforcement. For example, in the
sample of 28 countries in Knack and Kneefer (1996), we nd a correlation of 0.83 between
trust and judicial eciency. This might not be a simple coincidence. Putnam (1993) and La
Porta et al. (1997a) suggest that the lack of social capital may negatively aect the working
of institutions, thus also the quality of law enforcement. If this were the case, our estimates
would grossly underestimate the overall impact of social capital.
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Information and the ability to assimilate it are essential inputs for portfolio allocation. If
some investors are not endowed with the necessary ability or information to manage their
portfolio, then they need to delegate this function. For the uninformed, delegation is the
only alternative to keeping their money under a mattress. But delegation requires trust.
Thus, to invest money in assets other than cash, trust becomes more necessary, the less
sophisticated the investor. Similarly, understanding the risks involved with writing a check
and the way to minimize them (e.g., writing `not transferable' on the back) requires some
level of sophistication. In the absence of sophistication, people will have to rely more on
trust.
In our empirical analysis, we use education as a measure of access to information and
information processing ability. The household sample contains the number of years of edu-
cation of the household head. We split the sample at the median level of education (8 years,
corresponding to the end of junior high school). Since for many years this was the mandatory
level of schooling, there exists a large mass of people at that level, which we include in the
low-education group. Hence, the higher number of observations in this subsample.
Table 11 presents the impact of trust on the portfolio allocation and use of checks sub-
divided according to the household heads level of education. As we can see in the rst two
columns, the impact of trust on the proportion of wealth invested in cash is three times
larger for low-educated households than for highly educated households. The dierence is
statistically signicant at the 1% level.
The same can be said for deposits. In fact, trust has no signicant impact on the pro-
portion of wealth invested in deposits among educated people, as should be the case, since
deposits are very well protected contractually. By contrast, trust has an economically and
statistically signicant impact on the proportion of wealth invested in deposits among house-
holds with low levels of education. A one standard deviation increase in trust increases the
proportion of wealth in deposits by 8 percentage points, equal to a 14% increase with respect
to the mean. The dierence between the impacts of trust in the two subgroups is signicant
30at the 1% level.
Also the proportion of wealth invested in stocks is more sensitive to trust among less
educated people. The dierence, however, is quantitatively small (only 20%) and is not
statistically signicant. This is surprising, because we would have expected the eect to be
stronger for equity investments, which require much more knowledge to be analyzed. This
weak result might be due to the paucity of low-educated families who own stock (3.6% versus
15% of the well educated families and a population average of 7%). The extreme infrequency
of the phenomenon makes it more subject to confounding eects. For example, widows
may retain the portfolio allocation of their deceased husbands, even when they do not have
the same level of education. To see whether this plays any role we re-estimated the two
regressions restricting the sample to male household's head. The dierence (not reported)
increases to 34%, but it is still not statistically signicant.
Finally, the last two columns of Table 11 report the estimates of the impact of trust on
the probability of using a check in the two subsamples. The impact of trust among low
educated people is eight times as big as the impact of trust among highly educated people,
and this dierence is statistically signicant at the 1% level. In fact, trust has no statistically
signicant impact among highly educated people.
Overall, the results suggest that trust is a more important input among less educated
people.
VII The Origins of Trust
In all the regressions we controlled for a measure of the quality of the court system. Therefore,
our results on trust cannot be interpreted as just the expectation of prompt legal enforcement.
This rules out the rst of the three hypotheses on the ultimate origin of trust discussed in
Section III. The other two interpretations are not mutually exclusive. Trust may capture
the expectation of non-legal enforcement, as argued by Putnam and formalized by Spagnolo
(1999). People trust each other because they interact in many dimensions and thus have
a lot of opportunities of \punishing" a person who abuses their trust (Coleman, 1990).
31Alternatively, trust may re
ect the expectation that people will behave cooperatively, as a
result of a moral attitude imprinted with education.
To try and identify the relative importance of the two, we focus on the households that
moved from their place of origin. For those, it is possible to separately identify the eect of
the environment they grew up in and the environment where they live. For these households,
then, we create two separate measures of trust. One is the Putnam measure of trust for the
province of birth, the other is the Putnam measure of trust for the province of residence.
To allow for possible dierences between movers and non movers, we introduce a separate
measure of trust for the households that did not move. This is the Putnam measure of trust
for the province of residence, which by construction coincides with the province of birth.
In Table 12 we re-estimate all the households regressions introducing these three variables.11
The pattern of all the results is fairly similar. In all the specications, the trust of origin
has the same sign as the trust of residence and in four out of seven cases it is statistically
signicant at conventional levels. With only one exception, the trust of residence is always
more important, representing between 55 and 92% of the overall eect of trust (i.e., the sum
of the eect of the trust of origin and the trust of residence). We think that this decompo-
sition may hold in general, since the overall eect of trust for movers is almost identical to
the eect of trust for non movers in all regressions.
We nd that the likelihood of receiving a loan from relatives and friends is more sensitive
to the trust of origin than to that of residence, albeit the dierence is not statistically
signicant. This is not surprising, since the network of friends and family should remain
where individuals grew up, and not where they currently live.
One possible objection to our interpretation that the trust of origin aects the use and
availability of nancial contracts is that the estimated coecients may simply capture the
eects of discrimination. While we cannot exclude this in general, in some cases we can
rule out that discrimination is the only source of this eect. In fact, it would be hard to
argue that individuals born in low trust areas hold more cash and less stock as a result of
11Of course, we cannot perform the same tests for rms, since they do not have a province of birth.
32discrimination, as columns I and III of Table VII indicate.
On the other hand, we do not think that statistical discrimination (i.e., the use of the
place of origin as a proxy for the true trustworthiness) is necessarily inconsistent with (or
alternative to) the importance of trust. In fact, if people coming from low trust areas are
less trustworthy (as suggested by the work of Glaeser et al. (1999)), it is optimal for others
to infer their level of trustworthiness on the basis of their ethnicity or place of birth. This
would be tantamount to discriminating against them.
Finally, if discrimination plays a very big role in the relation between trust and the use
of nancial contracts, the overall eect of trust for movers should be much bigger than the
eect of trust for non movers who do not face discrimination. As we already mentioned,
this is not the case. The sum of the eects of the two trust measures for movers is almost
identical to the total eect for non movers.
VIII Conclusions
Our analysis identies a very strong correlation between the level of social capital prevailing
in an area and the use and availability of nancial contracts. This eect is not simply due
to omitted environmental variables, because the behavior of movers is still aected by the
level of trust of their provinces of origin. This eect is also bigger when legal enforcement is
weaker and when theory predicts social capital should matter more.
Thus, our ndings show that social capital plays an important role in the degree of nan-
cial development across dierent parts of Italy. The obvious question is how generalizable
these results are. Is this just a feature of a country with an inecient legal enforcement? Is
it an eect we can nd only in a microeconomic analysis that does not have any aggregate
consequences?
We cannot fully rule out the rst possibility. In fact, our analysis of the interaction be-
tween trust and legal enforcement suggests that trust is much less important (sometimes not
important at all) where the court system is more ecient or where people are more educated.
One could legitimately question the importance of social capital in highly developed coun-
33tries, with good legal enforcement and high levels of education. Most of the world, however,
does not t this description. Hence, social capital is likely to be very important in explaining
the success (or lack thereof) of developing countries.
We can, instead, try to answer the second question. Knack and Kneefer (1996) report
an aggregate measure of trust by country, derived from the World Values Survey. After
controlling for the degree of law enforcement, we nd a positive and statistically signicant
correlation between this measure of trust and several indicators of nancial development used
by La Porta et al. (1997b): the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP, the number of
listed companies per million of population, and the diusion of corporate ownership. While
this is far from a denite proof, it suggests that our results extend beyond a single country.
More importantly, all these results together emphasize the pervasiveness of the eects of
social capital and the importance of more research in this area.
34Table 1:
Summary Statistics
Panel A comes from the Survey of Households Income and Wealth (SHIW), covering the period 1989-
1995. The proportion of a household portfolio invested in cash/deposits/stocks is obtained as the amount of
holdings in cash/deposits/stocks divided by total household nancial wealth. \Use of checks" is an indicator
variable equal to one if a household responds positively to the question: \Did you or some other member of the
household issue checks in the course of the year to settle transactions?". \Discouraged and Turned down" is
an indicator variable equal to one if an household responds positively to at least one of the following questions:
\During the year did you or a member of the household think of applying for a loan or a mortgage to a bank or
other nancial intermediary, but then changed your mind on the expectation that the application would have
been turned down?"; "During the year did you or a member of the household apply for a loan or a mortgage to
a bank or other nancial intermediary and your application was turned down?". \Family loan" is an indicator
variable equal to one if an household responds positively to the question: \As of the end of the year did you
have debts outstanding towards friends or relatives not living with you?" Trust is an indicator of social capital
at the local level devised by Putnam (1993). It is the average participation to national referendums, measured
at the provincial level. The variable north (south) is an indicator variable taking value one if an individual
is resident in a northern (southern) region of Italy (which according to Putnam (1993) are characterized by
dierent level of social capital and trust). Trust of origin is the Putnam measure of social capital computed
for the province of birth of an individual. Judicial ineciency is the number of years it takes to complete
a rst-degree trial in the local courts. For monetary variables, as Per Capita GDP, Household Income and
Household Wealth, we use an exchange rate of $ 1 = Lit 1,800.
Panel B comes from the Survey of Manufacturing Firms (SMF) conducted every three years in Italy on
a sample of small and medium-sized manufacturing rms with at least 10 employees. \Turned down" is an
indicator variable taking value one if a rm answers positively to the question: \In 1994 did you apply to
a bank or a nancial intermediary to have your loans increased and have been turned down by all of those
you applied to". \One shareholder" is an indicator variable taking value one if the largest shareholder holds
100 percent of the rm's shares. Firm's age is computed as 1994 minus the year of foundation. Leverage
is the ratio of total rm debt as of the end of 1993 to total end of period asset. "Number of employees" is
the number of rm's employees as of the end of 1993. "Sales" is the rm's sales (million dollars) as of the
end of 1993. \Group" is an indicator variable equal to one if the rm belongs to a group; zero otherwise.
"Corporation" is another indicator variable equal to one if the rm is incorporated. Small size is an indicator
variable taking value one if the number of employees in 1994 is below the median value (which is equal to 67).
"Local competition" is an indicator variable equal to one if the rm's major competitors are located in the
same geographical area. For monetary variables, as Per Capita GDP, and Sales, we use an exchange rate of
$ 1 = Lit 1,800.
35Panel A: Household Sample
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. N
% wealth in cash 0.24 0.34 0.00 1.00 32,286
% wealth in deposits 0.56 0.38 0.00 1.00 32,286
% wealth in stock 0.03 0.12 0.00 1.00 32,286
Use of checks 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 32,617
Discouraged 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 32,617
Turned down 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 32,617
Family loans 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 32,617
Trust 0.78 0.07 0.63 0.89 32,617
Trust -Origin 0.77 0.08 0.62 0.89 32,136
Judicial ineciency 3.63 1.25 1.44 8.32 32,617
Judicial ineciency squared 14.75 11.10 2.08 69.28 32,617
North 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 32,617
South 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 32,617
Per capita GDP (in dollars) 16,666 5,555 5,555 38,888 32,617
Household Income (in dollars) 25,318 18,429 0 428,376 32,617
Household Wealth (in dollars) 136,451 233,101 -104,023 9,888,889 32,396
Age 53.04 15.10 17.00 90.00 32,617
Education 8.21 4.67 0.00 18.00 32,617
# people living in the house 3.00 1.37 1.00 9.00 32,617
Married 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 32,617
Male 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00 32,617
# Kids 0.65 0.94 0.00 7.00 32,617
Panel B: Firm Sample
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. N
Turned down 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 3,556
One shareholder 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 4,173
Trust 0.82 0.05 0.62 0.89 4,361
North 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00 4,434
South 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 4,434
Judicial Ineciency 3.16 0.91 1.44 8.32 4,361
Judicial ineciency squared 10.79 7.41 2.07 69.28 4,361
Per capita GDP (in dollars) 16,666 5,555 5,555 38,888 4,361
Age 26.34 23.18 0.00 144.00 4,403
Growth (%) 1.24 1.08 0.00 54.90 4,152
Leverage 0.26 0.19 0.00 0.83 3,582
ROA 0.03 0.09 -0.63 1.69 3,572
# employees 231 1,329 3 76,000 3,572
Sales (million dollars) 50,555 493,333 0 22,550,000 3,572
Group 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 4,419
Corporation 0.85 0.36 0.00 1.00 4,434
Small size 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 4,434
Local competition 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 4,434
36Table 2:
Eect of Trust on the Amount of Financial Wealth
Invested in Cash
The dependent variable is the proportion of nancial wealth a household detains in cash. For all columns
but the last one the reported coecients are tobit estimates. In the last column the reported coecients
are OLS estimates with xed province eects. The sample is a quasi-panel of Italian families in 1989, 1991,
1993 and 1995. Some of the individuals are interviewed in more than one year. Panel A contains multiple
observations of the same individual, while Panel B contains only the earliest observation for every respondent.
Trust is an indicator of social capital at the local level devised by Putnam (1993). It is the average participation
to national referendums, measured at the provincial level. The variable north (south) is an indicator variable
taking value one if an individual is resident in a northern (southern) region of Italy (which according to Putnam
(1993) are characterized by dierent level of social capital and trust). Trust of origin is the Putnam measure of
social capital computed for the province of birth of an individual. Judicial ineciency is the number of years
it takes to complete a rst-degree trial in the local courts. All the regressions contain the following control
variables (not reported): household income (linear and squared), household wealth (linear and squared), the
number of people belonging to the household, the number of kids in the household, household head age (linear
and squared), his/her education (number of years of schooling), indicator variables for whether the head is
married, is a male, for the sector in which he/she works, and for the level of job he/she has, plus three calendar
year dummies. The standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for clustering of the residual at the
provincial level.
37Panel A: Whole Sample
I II III IV
Trust -1.013 -0.539
( 0.162 ) ( 0.197 )
North -0.051 -0.048
( 0.016 ) ( 0.014 )
South 0.148 0.087
( 0.028 ) ( 0.028 )
Trust of origin -0.236
( 0.040 )
Judicial ineciency 0.127 0.084 0.087
( 0.028 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 0.024 )
Judicial ineciency squared -0.014 -0.010 -0.010
( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 )
Per capita GDP -1.001 -0.323 -0.151
( 0.356 ) ( 0.485 ) ( 0.390 )
Pseudo-R2 0.199 0.202 0.204 0.259
N 32,286 32,286 32,286 31,805
38Panel B: Only Non-Repeated Observations
I II III IV
Trust -0.998 -0.579
( 0.165 ) ( 0.200 )
North -0.046 -0.044
( 0.017 ) ( 0.014 )
South 0.146 0.079
( 0.030 ) ( 0.031 )
Trust of origin -0.257
( 0.047 )
Judicial ineciency 0.134 0.093 0.097
( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.030 )
Judicial ineciency squared -0.014 -0.010 -0.011
( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 )
Per capita GDP -1.365 -0.747 -0.518
( 0.382 ) ( 0.519 ) ( 0.410 )
Pseudo-R2 0.206 0.207 0.210 0.272
N 23,019 23,019 23,019 22,658
39Table 3:
Eect of Trust on the Amount of Financial Wealth
Invested in Bank Deposits
The dependent variable is the proportion of nancial wealth a household detains in bank and postal
deposits. For all columns but the last one the reported coecients are tobit estimates. In the last column
the reported coecients are OLS estimates with xed province eects. The sample is a quasi-panel of Italian
families in 1989, 1991, 1993 and 1995. Trust is an indicator of social capital at the local level devised by
Putnam (1993). It is the average participation to national referendums, measured at the provincial level.
The variable north (south) is an indicator variable taking value one if an individual is resident in a northern
(southern) region of Italy (which according to Putnam (1993) are characterized by dierent level of social
capital and trust). Trust of origin is the Putnam measure of social capital computed for the province of birth
of an individual. Judicial ineciency is the number of years it takes to complete a rst-degree trial in the local
courts. All the regressions contain the following control variables (not reported): household income (linear
and squared), household wealth (linear and squared), the number of people belonging to the household, the
number of kids in the household, household head age (linear and squared), his/her education (number of years
of schooling), indicator variables for whether the head is married, is a male, for the sector in which he/she
works, and for the level of job he/she has, plus three calendar year dummies. The standard errors reported
in parentheses are corrected for the potential clustering of the residual at the provincial level.
I II III IV
Trust 0.845 0.648
( 0.153 ) ( 0.197 )
North -0.021 -0.024
( 0.014 ) ( 0.013 )
South -0.128 -0.055
( 0.025 ) ( 0.024 )
Trust of origin -0.069
( 0.049 )
Judicial ineciency -0.074 -0.070 -0.074
( 0.027 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.026 )
Judicial ineciency squared 0.008 0.008 0.008
( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 )
Per capita GDP -0.543 -0.521 -0.729
( 0.511 ) ( 0.555 ) ( 0.446 )
Pseudo-R2 0.045 0.044 0.046 0.062
N 32,286 32,286 32,286 31,805
40Table 4:
Eect of Trust on the Demand for Equity
The dependent variable is the proportion of nancial wealth a household detains in stocks or mutual funds.
For all columns but the last one the reported coecients are tobit estimates. In the last column the reported
coecients are OLS estimates with xed province eects. The sample is a quasi-panel of Italian families in
1989, 1991, 1993 and 1995. Trust is an indicator of social capital at the local level devised by Putnam (1993).
It is the average participation to national referendums, measured at the provincial level. The variable north
(south) is an indicator variable taking value one if an individual is resident in a northern (southern) region
of Italy (which according to Putnam (1993) are characterized by dierent level of social capital and trust).
Trust of origin is the Putnam measure of social capital computed for the province of birth of an individual.
Judicial ineciency is the number of years it takes to complete a rst-degree trial in the local courts. All
the regressions contain the following control variables (not reported): household income (linear and squared),
household wealth (linear and squared), the number of people belonging to the household, the number of kids
in the household, household head age (linear and squared), his/her education (number of years of schooling),
indicator variables for whether the head is married, is a male, for the sector in which he/she works, and for
the level of job he/she has, plus three calendar year dummies. The standard errors reported in parentheses
are corrected for the potential clustering of the residual at the provincial level.
I II III IV
Trust 1.883 0.873
( 0.361 ) ( 0.492 )
North 0.219 0.210
( 0.044 ) ( 0.042 )
South -0.229 -0.130
( 0.067 ) ( 0.087 )
Trust of origin 0.052
( 0.015 )
Judicial ineciency -0.071 0.046 0.037
( 0.099 ) ( 0.081 ) ( 0.076 )
Judicial ineciency squared 0.006 -0.003 -0.002
( 0.011 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 )
Per capita GDP 1.017 -0.175 -0.464
( 1.664 ) ( 0.992 ) ( 0.894 )
Pseudo-R2 0.258 0.265 0.267 0.138
N 32,286 32,286 32,286 31,805
41Table 5:
Eect of Trust on the Use of Checks
The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking value one if the interviewed household responds
positively to the question: \Did you or some other member of the household issue checks in the course of the
year to settle transactions?" For all columns but the last one the reported coecients are probit estimates of
the eect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressor on the probability of using a check, computed
at the sample mean of the independent variables. The coecients reported in the last column are from a
linear probability model with xed province eects. The sample is a quasi-panel of Italian families in 1989,
1991, 1993 and 1995. In column II the sample is restricted to the individuals owning a bank account. Trust
is an indicator of social capital at the local level devised by Putnam (1993). It is the average participation
to national referendums, measured at the provincial level. The variable north (south) is an indicator variable
taking value one if an individual is resident in a northern (southern) region of Italy (which according to Putnam
(1993) are characterized by dierent level of social capital and trust). Trust of origin is the Putnam measure of
social capital computed for the province of birth of an individual. Judicial ineciency is the number of years
it takes to complete a rst-degree trial in the local courts. All the regressions contain the following control
variables (not reported): household income (linear and squared), household wealth (linear and squared), the
number of people belonging to the household, the number of kids in the household, household head age (linear
and squared), his/her education (number of years of schooling), indicator variables for whether the head is
married, is a male, for the sector in which he/she works, and for the level of job he/she has, plus three calendar
year dummies. The standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for the potential clustering of the
residual at the provincial level.
I II III IV V
Trust 0.713 0.364 0.157
( 0.196 ) ( 0.205 ) ( 0.250 )
North 0.107 0.106
( 0.031 ) ( 0.032 )
South -0.098 -0.080
( 0.028 ) ( 0.034 )
Trust of origin 0.231
( 0.055 )
Judicial ineciency -0.097 -0.061 -0.033 -0.034
( 0.065 ) ( 0.065 ) ( 0.051 ) ( 0.051 )
Judicial ineciency squared 0.009 0.005 0.003 0.004
( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.005 )
Per capita GDP 4.632 4.502 3.450 3.401
( 0.944 ) ( 0.924 ) ( 0.636 ) ( 0.637 )
Pseudo-R2 0.270 0.207 0.275 0.275 0.329
N 32,396 27,683 32,396 32,396 31,915
42Table 6:
Eect of Trust on the Availability of Consumer
Credit
The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking value one if a household responds positively to
at least one of the following questions:\During the year did you or a member of the household think of
applying for a loan or a mortgage to a bank or other nancial intermediary, but then changed your mind
on the expectation that the application would have been turned down?"; \During the year did you or a
member of the household applied for a loan or a mortgage to a bank or other nancial intermediary and
your application was turned down?". In columns I-III, the reported coecients are probit estimates of the
eect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressor on the probability of being discouraged or turned
down, computed at the sample mean of the independent variables. In column IV the reported coecients
are OLS estimates of a linear probability model with xed province eects. The sample is a quasi-panel of
Italian families in 1989, 1991, 1993 and 1995. Trust is an indicator of social capital at the local level devised
by Putnam (1993). It is the average participation to national referendums, measured at the provincial level.
Judicial ineciency is the number of years it takes to complete a rst-degree trial in the local courts. All
the regressions contain the following control variables (not reported): household income (linear and squared),
household wealth (linear and squared), the number of people belonging to the household, the number of kids
in the household, household head age (linear and squared), his/her education (number of years of schooling),
indicator variables for whether the head is married, is a male, for the sector in which he/she works, and for
the level of job he/she has, plus three calendar year dummies. The standard errors, which are reported in
parentheses, are corrected for the potential clustering of the residual at the provincial level.
I II III IV
Trust -0.064 -0.085
( 0.018 ) ( 0.024 )
North -0.005 -0.005
( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 )
South 0.003 -0.006
( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 )
Trust of origin -0.041
( 0.022 )
Judicial ineciency 0.011 0.009 0.010
( 0.004 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.004 )
Judicial ineciency squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )
Per capita GDP 0.276 0.235 0.261
( 0.103 ) ( 0.081 ) ( 0.087 )
Pseudo-R2 0.068 0.067 0.069 0.020
N 32,396 32,396 32,396 31,915
43Table 7:
Eect of Trust on the Informal Credit Market
The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking value one if a household responds positively to the
question: \As of the end of the year did you have debts outstanding towards friends or relatives not living
with you?" In columns I-III the reported coecients are probit estimates of the eect of a marginal change
in the corresponding regressor on the probability of being indebted with a relative or friend, computed at
the sample mean of the independent variables. In column IV the reported coecients are OLS estimates of a
linear probability model with xed province eects. The sample is a quasi-panel of Italian families in 1989,
1991, 1993 and 1995. Trust is an indicator of social capital at the local level devised by Putnam (1993). It
is the average participation to national referendums, measured at the provincial level. Trust of origin is the
Putnam measure of social capital computed for the province of birth of an individual. Judicial ineciency is
the number of years it takes to complete a rst-degree trial in the local courts. All the regressions contain
the following control variables (not reported): household income (linear and squared), household wealth
(linear and squared), the number of people belonging to the household, the number of kids in the household,
household head age (linear and squared), his/her education (number of years of schooling), indicator variables
for whether the head is married, is a male, for the sector in which he/she works, and for the level of job he/she
has, plus three calendar year dummies. The standard errors reported in parentheses and are corrected for the
potential clustering of the residual at the provincial level.
I II III IV
Trust -0.104 -0.129
( 0.026 ) ( 0.043 )
North 0.004 0.005
( 0.006 ) ( 0.005 )
South 0.011 -0.004
( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 )
Trust of origin -0.072
( 0.023 )
Judicial ineciency -0.001 0.001 0.002
( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.007 )
Judicial ineciency squared 0.000 0.000 0.000
( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 )
Per capita GDP 0.198 0.106 0.144
( 0.124 ) ( 0.143 ) ( 0.152 )
Pseudo-R2 0.083 0.080 0.083 0.032
N 32,396 32,396 32,396 31,915
44Table 8:
Eect of Trust on the Availability of Credit to
Firms
The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking value one if a rm responds positively to the
question: \In 1994 did you apply to a bank or a nancial intermediary to have your loans increased and have
been turned down by all of those you applied to". The sample is a cross-section of Italian manufacturing rms
with at least 10 employees. Trust is an indicator of social capital at the local level devised by Putnam (1993).
It is the average participation to national referendums, measured at the provincial level. Judicial ineciency
is the number of years it takes to complete a rst-degree trial in the local courts. All the regressions contain
the following control variables (not reported): rm age (computed as 1994 minus the year of foundation),
its growth rate in sales, its leverage (ratio of debt to total assets), return on assets, indicator variables for
whether the rm belongs to a group, is incorporated, has a number of employees below the median value, and
has its major competitors located in the same area. The reported coecients are probit estimates of the eect
of a marginal change in the corresponding regressor on the probability of being turned down, computed at
the sample mean of the independent variables. The standard errors reported in parentheses and are corrected
for the potential clustering of the residual at the provincial level.
I II III
Trust -0.261 -0.142
( 0.066 ) ( 0.082 )
North -0.001 0.001
( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 )
South 0.068 0.041
( 0.028 ) ( 0.027 )
Judicial ineciency 0.001 0.003 0.001
( 0.020 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.020 )
Judicial ineciency squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 )
Per capita GDP -0.351 -0.225 -0.229
( 0.270 ) ( 0.274 ) ( 0.266 )
Pseudo-R2 0.039 0.040 0.041
N 2,840 2,840 2,840
45Table 9:
Eect of Trust on Firms' Ownership Structure
The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking value one if a rm has a single shareholder owning
all the shares. The sample is a cross-section of Italian manufacturing rms with at least 10 employees. Trust
is an indicator of social capital at the local level devised by Putnam (1993). It is the average participation to
national referendums, measured at the provincial level. Judicial ineciency is the number of years it takes to
complete a rst-degree trial in the local courts. All the regressions contain the following control variables (not
reported): rm age (computed as 1994 minus the year of foundation), its growth rate in sales, its leverage
(ratio of debt to total assets), return on assets, indicator variables for whether the rm belongs to a group,
is incorporated, has a number of employees below the median value, and has its major competitors located
in the same area. The reported coecients are probit estimates of the eect of a marginal change in the
corresponding regressor on the probability of having just one shareholder, computed at the sample mean of
the independent variables. The standard errors reported in parentheses and are corrected for the potential
clustering of the residual at the provincial level.
I II III
Trust -0.394 -0.468
( 0.152 ) ( 0.167 )
North -0.023 -0.015
( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 )
South 0.021 -0.029
( 0.030 ) ( 0.028 )
Judicial ineciency -0.039 -0.028 -0.026
( 0.029 ) ( 0.030 ) ( 0.029 )
Judicial ineciency squared 0.003 0.004 0.004
( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 )
Per capita GDP 0.324 0.319 0.286
( 0.402 ) ( 0.483 ) ( 0.420 )
Pseudo-R2 0.105 0.104 0.105
N 3,268 3,268 3,268
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Trust and Law Enforcement
This table re-estimates the basic regressions, splitting the sample between provinces with relatively e-
cient judicial system (judicial ineciency below the median) and provinces with relatively inecient judicial
system (judicial ineciency above the median). Judicial ineciency is measured by the number of years it
takes to complete a rst-degree trial in the local courts. Panels A and B refer to the household sample, Panel
C to the rm sample.
In Panels A and B, the proportion of a household portfolio invested in cash/deposits/stocks is obtained as
the amount of holdings in cash/deposits/stocks divided by total household nancial wealth. \Use of checks"
is an indicator variable equal to one if a household responds positively to the question: \Did you or some
other member of the household issue checks in the course of the year to settle transactions?". \Discouraged or
Turned down" is an indicator variable equal to one if an household responds positively to at least one of the
following questions: \During the year did you or a member of the household think of applying for a loan or a
mortgage to a bank or other nancial intermediary, but then changed your mind on the expectation that the
application would have been turned down?", "During the year did you or a member of the household applied
for a loan or a mortgage to a bank or other nancial intermediary and your application was turned down?".
\Loan F&F" is an indicator variable equal to one if a household responds positively to the question: \As of
the end of the year did you have debts outstanding towards friends or relatives not living with you?" Trust
is an indicator of social capital at the local level devised by Putnam (1993). It is the average participation
to national referendums, measured at the provincial level. The variable north (south) is an indicator variable
taking value one if an individual is resident in a northern (southern) region of Italy (which according to Putnam
(1993) are characterized by dierent level of social capital and trust). Trust of origin is the Putnam measure of
social capital computed for the province of birth of an individual. Judicial ineciency is the number of years
it takes to complete a rst-degree trial in the local courts. All the regressions contain the following control
variables (not reported): household income (linear and squared), household wealth (linear and squared), the
number of people belonging to the household, the number of kids in the household, household head age (linear
and squared), his/her education (number of years of schooling), indicator variables for whether the head is
married, is a male, for the sector in which he/she works, and for the level of job he/she has, plus three calendar
year dummies.
In Panel C, \turned down" is an indicator variable taking value one if a rm answers positively to the
question: \In 1994 did you apply to a bank or a nancial intermediary to have your loans increased and have
been turned down by all of those you applied to". \One shareholder" is an indicator variable taking value
one if the largest shareholder holds 100 percent of the rm's shares. All the regressions contain the following
control variables (not reported): rm age (computed as 1994 minus the year of foundation), its growth rate
in sales, its leverage (ratio of debt to total assets), return on assets, indicator variables for whether the rm
belongs to a group, is incorporated, and has a number of employees below the median value.
Panel A reports Tobit estimates, panel B and C probit ones. In such cases the reported coecients
are probit estimates of the eect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressor on the probability of
having just one shareholder, computed at the sample mean of the independent variables. The standard errors
reported in parentheses are corrected for the potential clustering of the residual at the provincial level.
47Panel A: Household sample - I
% cash in portfolio % deposits in portfolio % stock in portfolio
Ecient Inecient Ecient Inecient Ecient Inecient
Trust -0.729 -1.172 0.707 0.847 0.891 3.277
( 0.228 ) ( 0.209 ) ( 0.192 ) ( 0.243 ) ( 0.419 ) ( 0.495 )
Judicial ineciency -0.307 -0.025 -0.187 0.077 1.468 -0.327
( 0.133 ) ( 0.058 ) ( 0.155 ) ( 0.066 ) ( 0.446 ) ( 0.216 )
Judicial ineciency squared 0.069 -0.001 0.030 -0.004 -0.282 0.032
( 0.026 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.029 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.080 ) ( 0.019 )
Per capita GDP -1.108 -0.479 -0.617 -0.158 1.622 -5.236
( 0.620 ) ( 0.588 ) ( 0.564 ) ( 0.727 ) ( 1.715 ) ( 1.897 )
Pseudo-R2 0.253 0.156 0.052 0.060 0.237 0.278
N 17,144 15142 17,144 15142 17,144 15,142
Panel B: Household sample- II
Prob. Use of checks Prob. Discouraged or turned down Loans F & F
Ecient Inecient Ecient Inecient Ecient Inecient
Trust 0.267 1.106 0.000 -0.109 -0.048 -0.152
( 0.267 ) ( 0.169 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 0.024 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.043 )
Judicial ineciency 0.518 -0.028 -0.039 0.010 0.052 -0.043
( 0.419 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.048 ) ( 0.020 )
Judicial ineciency squared -0.101 0.004 0.009 -0.001 -0.008 0.004
( 0.074 ) ( 0.007 ( 0.003 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.002 )
Per capita GDP 4.561 2.893 0.040 0.552 0.033 0.141
( 0.963 ) ( 0.591 ( 0.128 ) ( 0.105 ) ( 0.120 ) ( 0.247 )
Pseudo-R2 0.239 0.284 0.067 0.075 0.082 0.093
N 17,198 15,198 17,198 15,198 17,198 15,19
Panel C: Firm sample
Prob. Turned down Prob. Only one sharehold.
Ecient Inecient Ecient Inecient
Trust -0.104 -0.278 -0.588 -0.374
( 0.158 ) ( 0.064 ) ( 0.235 ) ( 0.182 )
Judicial ineciency -0.189 -0.021 0.291 0.094
( 0.168 ) ( 0.029 ( 0.337 ) ( 0.055 )
Judicial ineciency squared 0.041 0.001 -0.054 -0.007
( 0.040 ) ( 0.003 ( 0.074 ) ( 0.005 )
Per capita GDP 0.740 -0.705 -1.460 1.490
( 0.334 ) ( 0.286 ( 0.408 ) ( 0.556 )
Pseudo-R2 0.045 0.060 0.108 0.127
N 1,194 1,616 1,397 1,871
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Trust and Education
This table re-estimates the basic regressions for the use of nancial instruments, splitting the sample on
the basis of the level of education of the household's head. A household is dened low educated if the head has
no more than 8 years of education. Correspondingly, a household is dened as highly educated if the head has
more than 8 years of education. The proportion of a household portfolio invested in cash/deposits/stocks is
obtained as the amount of holdings in cash/deposits/stocks divided by total household nancial wealth. \Use
of checks" is an indicator variable equal to one if a household responds positively to the question: \Did you
or some other member of the household issue checks in the course of the year to settle transactions?". Trust
is an indicator of social capital at the local level devised by Putnam (1993). It is the average participation
to national referendums, measured at the provincial level. The variable north (south) is an indicator variable
taking value one if an individual is resident in a northern (southern) region of Italy (which according to Putnam
(1993) are characterized by dierent level of social capital and trust). Trust of origin is the Putnam measure of
social capital computed for the province of birth of an individual. Judicial ineciency is the number of years
it takes to complete a rst-degree trial in the local courts. All the regressions contain the following control
variables (not reported): household income (linear and squared), household wealth (linear and squared), the
number of people belonging to the household, the number of kids in the household, household head age (linear
and squared), his/her education (number of years of schooling), indicator variables for whether the head is
married, is a male, for the sector in which he/she works, and for the level of job he/she has, plus three calendar
year dummies.
Panel A reports Tobit estimates, panel B and C probit ones. In such cases the reported coecients
are probit estimates of the eect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressor on the probability of
having just one shareholder, computed at the sample mean of the independent variables. The standard errors
reported in parentheses are corrected for the potential clustering of the residual at the provincial level.
% cash in portfolio % deposits in portfolio % stock in portfolio Use of checks
Education level Education level Education level Education level
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Trust -1.186 -0.387 1.148 -0.037 1.999 1.651 0.857 0.084
( 0.212 ) ( 0.081 ) ( 0.200 ) ( 0.102 ) ( 0.501 ) ( 0.322 ( 0.183 ) ( 0.167 )
Judicial ineciency 0.155 0.056 -0.115 0.024 0.131 -0.158 -0.097 -0.055
( 0.034 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 0.124 ) ( 0.103 ( 0.057 ) ( 0.055 )
Judicial ineciency squared -0.017 -0.006 0.013 -0.002 -0.020 0.016 0.009 0.004
( 0.004 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.012 ( 0.005 ) ( 0.006 )
Per capita GDP -1.025 -0.534 -0.161 -1.439 -0.793 1.503 4.868 1.839
( 0.490 ) ( 0.245 ) ( 0.454 ) ( 0.717 ) ( 2.207 ) ( 1.537 ( 1.210 ) ( 0.678 )
Pseudo-R2 0.172 0.984 0.061 0.084 0.247 0.183 0.246 0.113
N 22,353 9,933 22,353 9,933 22,353 9,933 22,353 9,933
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The Origins of Trust
In this table we modify the way in which trust enters all the basic regressions for households. For the
families that moved across provinces, we dierentiate between trust of the province of birth and trust of the
province of residence. Then, we have the trust of people who did not move. The proportion of a household
portfolio invested in cash/deposits/stocks is obtained as the amount of holdings in cash/deposits/stocks
divided by total household nancial wealth. \Use of checks" is an indicator variable equal to one if a household
responds positively to the question: \Did you or some other member of the household issue checks in the
course of the year to settle transactions?". \Discouraged or Turned Down" is an indicator variable equal
to one if a household responds positively to at least one of the following questions: \During the year did
you or a member of the household think of applying for a loan or a mortgage to a bank or other nancial
intermediary, but then changed your mind on the expectation that the application would have been turned
down?", "During the year did you or a member of the household applied for a loan or a mortgage to a bank
or other nancial intermediary and your application was turned down?". \Loan F&F" is an indicator variable
equal to one if a household responds positively to the question: \As of the end of the year did you have debts
outstanding towards friends or relatives not living with you?" Trust is an indicator of social capital at the
local level devised by Putnam (1993). It is the average participation to national referendums, measured at the
provincial level. The variable north (south) is an indicator variable taking value one if an individual is resident
in a northern (southern) region of Italy (which according to Putnam (1993) are characterized by dierent level
of social capital and trust). \Trust non movers" is our measure of trust interacted with a dummy variable
equal to one if the province of residence is equal to the province of origin of the household's head. \Trust of
origin movers" is our measure of trust computed for the province of birth of the household's head interacted
with a dummy variable equal to one if the province of origin is not equal to the province of residence. \Trust
of residence movers" is our measure of trust computed for the province of residence interacted with a dummy
variable equal to one if the province of origin is not equal to the province of residence. Judicial ineciency
is the number of years it takes to complete a rst-degree trial in the local courts. All the regressions contain
the following control variables (not reported): household income (linear and squared), household wealth
(linear and squared), the number of people belonging to the household, the number of kids in the household,
household head age (linear and squared), his/her education (number of years of schooling), indicator variables
for whether the head is married, is a male, for the sector in which he/she works, and for the level of job
he/she has, plus three calendar year dummies. The rst three columns report Tobit estimates, the others
probit ones. In these latter cases the reported coecients are estimates of the eect of a marginal change in
the corresponding regressor on the probability of having just one shareholder, computed at the sample mean
of the independent variables. The standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for the potential
clustering of the residual at the provincial level.
50Discouraged or Loan
Cash Deposits Stock Checks Turned down from F&F
Trust non movers -1.035 0.833 2.026 0.733 -0.071 -0.118
( 0.162 ) ( 0.155 ) ( 0.365 ) ( 0.195 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.026 )
Trust of origin movers -0.279 0.050 0.657 0.300 - 0.027 -0.066
( 0.100 ) ( 0.122 ) ( 0.189 ) ( 0.082 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.022 )
Trust of residence movers -0.777 0.806 1.347 0.480 -0.041 -0.046
( 0.174 ) ( 0.185 ) ( 0.210 ) ( 0.203 ) ( 0.025 ) ( 0.031 )
Judicial ineciency 0.125 -0.074 -0.061 -0.096 0.011 0.000
( 0.028 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 0.032 ) ( 0.064 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.007 )
Judicial ineciency squared -0.013 0.008 0.005 0.009 -0.001 0.000
( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.001 )
Per capita GDP -1.015 -0.610 1.197 4.518 0.260 0.169
( 0.357 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.663 ) ( 0.920 ) ( 0.107 ) ( 0.127 )
Pseudo-R2 0.201 0.046 0.260 0.270 0.069 0.086
N 31,805 31,805 31,805 31,915 31,915 31,915
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53Appendix
1. The SHIW
The Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) collects detailed data on demograph-
ics, households' consumption, income and balance sheets. The survey started to be run in the mid 1960s but
is available on tape only since 1984. Over time, the survey has gone various changes regarding sample size
and design, sampling methodology and questionnaire contents. Since 1989, however, sampling methodology,
sample size and broad contents of the information collected is unchanged. For this reason, in this study we
choose to rely on the four latest waves (1989, 1991, 1993 and 1995). Each survey covers more than 8,000
households for a total of 32,648 household-year observations. Each SHIW surveys a representative sample of
the Italian resident population. Sampling is in two stages, rst municipalities and then households. Munici-
palities are divided into 51 strata dened by 17 regions and 3 classes of population size (more than 40,000,
20,000 to 40,000, less than 20,000). Households are randomly selected from registry oce records. Households
are dened as groups of individuals related by blood, marriage or adoption and sharing the same dwelling.
The head of the household is conventionally identied with the husband, if present. If instead the person who
would usually be considered the head of the household works abroad or was absent from the household at the
time the interview took place, the head of the household is the person responsible for managing the house-
hold's resources. The net response rate (ratio of responses to contacted households net of ineligible units) is
38 percent in 1989, 33 percent in 1991, 58 percent in 1993, and 57 percent in 1995. Increased response rate
may be due to a change in the surveying company in 1993. Brandolini and Cannari (1994) present a detailed
discussion of sample design, attrition, and other measurement issues, and comparisons of the SHIW variables
with the corresponding aggregates. Starting in 1989, each SHIW has re-interviewed some households from
the previous surveys. The panel component has increased over time: 15 percent of the previous survey sample
was re-interviewed in 1989, 27 percent in 1991, 43 percent in 1993, and 45 percent in 1995. In the panel
component, the sampling procedure is also determined in two stages: selection of municipalities (among those
sampled in the previous survey), and then selection of households re-interviewed. This implies that there is a
xed component in the panel (for instance, households interviewed 5 times between 1987 to 1995, or 4 times
from 1991 to 1995) and a new component in every survey (for instance, households re-interviewed only in
1989).
Variables' Denition:
In the empirical estimates all demographic variables - age, education, gender, whether is married, type of
occupation and sector - refer to the household head. Monetary variables (income, wealth and consumption)
are de
ated using the Consumer Price Index and expressed in 1995 lire.
Cash holdings
The following question was asked of household heads in each of the surveys: "What is the average amount
of cash held in your family?"
Deposits, Stocks and mutual funds ownership and amounts
In a typical survey households are asked rst to report ownership of the specic nancial instrument and
then to indicate the portfolio share, in 1989, or to report the asset bracket in a list of 14 possible brackets,
in 1991, 1993 and 1995. In 1989 assets amounts are obtained combining knowledge of the shares, of the
value of nancial wealth held in cash and the fact that portfolio shares add up to 1. In 1991, 1993 and 1995,
assets amounts are imputed assuming that the household holds the mid-point of the reported interval. It
is clear from this procedure that while stocks and mutual funds ownership only suers from non-reporting,
their amounts is aected by imputation errors. For details on how nancial assets values are computed in the
SHIW see Guiso and Jappelli (1999)
Discouraged borrowers and turned down consumers
The following questions were asked in each survey: "During the year did you or a member of the household
think of applying for a loan or a mortgage to a bank or other nancial intermediary, but then changed your
mind on the expectation that the application would have been turned down?" Those answering yes to this
question are classied as "discouraged borrowers". Those answering yes to the following questions are classied
as "turned down" consumers: "During the year did you or a member of the household applied for a loan or
a mortgage to a bank or other nancial intermediary and your application was turned down?"
Use of checks and number of checks issued
54The following questions were asked to household heads in each of the surveys: " Did you or some other
member of the household issue checks in the course of the year to settle transactions?" If the answer to the
question is yes "How many checks did your family issued on average in per month over the year?" To obtain
the number of checks issued in a year we multiply the reported monthly gure by 12.
Loans from friends or relatives
The following questions were asked to household heads in each of the surveys: "As of the end of the
year did you have debts outstanding towards friends or relatives not living with you? If yes, what is their
amount?" This information is used to compute the existence and value of informal loans.
Consumption, income and wealth
Consumption is the sum of the expenditure on food consumption, entertainment, education, clothes,
medical expenses, housing repairs and additions, and imputed rents. Expenditures on durable goods (vehicles,
furniture and appliances, art objects) are therefore not included in the denition of consumption. Income
is the sum of earnings of all members of the households that worked for part or the whole year, pension
income accruing to retired members, income from capital and transfers. Wealth is the total of nancial and
real assets net of household debt. The rst is the sum of cash balances, checking accounts, savings accounts,
postal deposits, government paper, corporate bonds, mutual funds and investment fund units, stocks. In
1989 total nancial wealth is readily available. For other years it must be estimated because the categories
of nancial assets (except cash holdings) were provided in 15 bands; the average value between the lower and
the upper band was used in determining the level of each asset. Real assets include investment real estate,
business wealth, primary residence and the stock of durables.
Education of the household head
This variable is originally coded as: no education (0); completed elementary school (5 years); completed
junior high school (8 years); completed high school (13 years); completed college (18 years); graduate education
(more than 20 years). The variable is coded according to the values given in parenthesis. For the highest
class we assume a value of 20 years.
Relative risk aversion
Relative risk aversion is the product of the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion and household's
consumption. The Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion is obtained from a direct question to a survey
lottery . Each survey participant is oered a hypothetical lottery and is asked to report the maximum price
that he would be willing to pay in order to participate. Specically, he is asked the following question:
"We would like to ask you a hypothetical question that we would like you to answer as if the situation was
a real one. You are oered the opportunity of acquiring a security permitting you, with the same probability,
either to gain 10 million lire or to lose all the capital invested. What is the most that you are prepared to
pay for this security?"
Ten million lire correspond to about Euros 5,000. Interviews are done personally at the consumer premises
by professional interviewers. These, in order to help understand the question, show an illustrative card to the
respondent and are ready to provide explanations. The respondent can answer in one of following three ways:
a) declare the maximum amount he is willing to pay to participate; b) don't know; c) unwilling to answer.
2. The 1994 SMF
The Survey of Manufacturing Firms (SMF) is conducted every three years on a sample of small and
medium-sized manufacturing rms with at least 10 employees. The sample comprised about 5,000 units until
the last wave, the 1994, which contains 4,431 rms. The information collected includes employment and
its composition, investment undertaken and types of investments and R&D activities, location, ownership
structure, industrial sector, year of foundation, capacity utilization, total sales, export sales and a number of
balance sheet items for the survey year and the two previous years. Also, detailed information on mergers,
acquisitions and break-ups is available. For rms with less than 500 employees, the sample is stratied by
gross product per employee in order to ensure representativeness.
Variables' Denition:
Ownership concentration
Dummy variable = 1 if the largest shareholder holds 100 percent of the rm's shares.
Turned down for credit
Firms in the survey were asked the following question: "In 1994 did you apply to a bank or a nancial
intermediary to have your loans increased and have been turned down by all of those you applied to". Firms
55answering yes are classied as turned down.
Firm Size
Dummy = 1 if the number of employees in 1994 is below the median value, equal to 67.
Leverage
Ratio of total rm debt as of the end of 1993 to total end of period rms liabilities.
Age
Computed as 1994 minus the year of foundation.
Group membership
Dummy variable: equal to 1 if the rm belongs to a group; zero otherwise.
Growth
Is the rate of growth in rm sales between 1989 and 1994.
Sector
Firms in the survey are classied in one of four sectors based on the SEC 4 digit industry classication:
traditional productions; productions involving large scale economies; highly specialized productions; rms in
high-tech productions.
3. Other variables
Trust and trust of origin
Trust is measured with voter turnout at the province level. Using data for all the European elections
(1979, 1984, 1989, 1994 and 1999) and on six referenda. These are: the institutional referenda for the choice
between monarchy and republic (June 1946); the referenda on public order (June 1978); the referenda on wage
indexation (June 1985); the second referenda on public order (May 1981); the referenda on nuclear power
(November 1987) and referenda on the electoral system in local government (the 1991). We did not use turn
out in the referenda on divorce (May 1974) and the referenda on abortion (May 19981) on the grounds that
participation was mainly driven by ideology and religion. For each province turnout data were than average
across time. Elections and referenda. Each family or rm was attached the measure of trust in the province
where it is located. For households, trust of origin is the measure of trust in the province of birth of the
household head.
Courts ineciency
The indicator of court ineciency is computed as the mean number of years it takes to complete a rst-
degree trial by the courts located in a province. It has been computed using courts level data on the length
of trials and then averaging out across courts located in the same province.
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